Abstract Applying Markov Stochastic Process theory, this paper attempts to suggest a tentative model explaining how private information may cause bargaining delay. It is shown that the bargaining delay is critically dependent on the specification of information. It turns out that the delay tends to be longer in bargaining where information is imperfect. This means that bargaining models frequently can have an infinite delay under imperfect information while they have finite delay of bargaining before reaching the agreements if information is perfect. Other interesting result is that bargaining delay may depend on who makes the offer first. And it is also shown that bargaining tends to end earlier if both players (seller and buyer) can make offers in turn than the case where only one side make a offer. 
Ⅰ. Introduction
This paper aims to suggest a tentative model of bargaining delay, in which there exists private information. It is not new that private information may be a barrier to efficient bargaining agreement. This paper is an attempt to analyze the problem of bargaining delay in different way from current other studies which use hazard rate, in particular, like the studies of strike duration. For example, see Heckman [8] , Crampton [3] , and more recently Vidual [21] . While talking about bargaining, thus, this paper does not discuss the typical issues in the studies of bargaining, like the existence, uniqueness or stability of equilibrium, etc.. We approach the issue in practical sense.
As a model to solve economic problem, the noncooperative or sequential bargaining theory has been discussed extensively for past several decades. It is shown that the noncooperative bargaining model can have a unique and stable solution under plausible or compelling assumptions. See Osborne and Rubinstein [15] , Admatti and Perry [1] , Mutto [13, 14] for a good summary of bargaining literatures. Binmore and Vulkan [2] is one recent example showing how the game theory can be applied to the bargaining situation.
However, surprisingly enough, there has not been much discussion about the problem of how long bargainers should bargain to arrive their unique and stable solution. Thus, most studies have been ignoring the observation that in the real economy, the costly delay of bargaining might be more important thing than the solution itself. When bargaining is over in the real economy, there is always a solution in some sense without regard to whether it is acceptable to both sides of bargaining or not. The point is here, that in the real economy, the more important question is not what players agree in a bargaining game, but how long they should bargain to get the agreement. Among the bargaining literatures, Kennan and Wilson [10] summarizes three models of bargaining delay and private information. They conclude that the existing bargaining models can not explain the real bargaining procedure and delay issues.
Crampton [3] shows that delay could be strategic. Feinberg and Skrzypacz [6] look at the effect of second order uncertainty on the delay in the bargaining. Vidual [21] is a recent paper dealing with the delay issue.
Unlike the previous studies, however, this paper takes a different approach so that it focus on the dynamic characteristics of bargaining procedure. More specifically, this paper describes the bargaining as a three state Markov process to look at the dynamic feature of bargaining procedure. Once bargaining procedure is described by Markov process, one can apply the so called the first step analysis in measuring the length of duration.
It is also assumed that the information is asymmetric in the sense that the agent of one side has no correct information about that of other side.
The result of this paper shows that the bargaining delay is possible because of the asymmetric information.
The duration of bargaining disagreement may be longer due to the lack of correct information about bargaining where notation for time is omitted. Then, the transition probability matrix can be written as follows, where Pij means the probability of moving from state i to state j, and it is function of exogenous variables.
[

II.2 Information and Bargaining Delay
When information is perfect so that each player knows other player's reservation price, the bargaining may end immediately: the solution would be
depending on who is the first mover. Here,   and   are discount factors for seller and buyer respectively. In a simple bargaining problem over the price of an object, the duration of bargaining tends to be very short and be one shot game when the information is perfect. The perfect information is a very unrealistic assumption which does not hold in the real bargaining problem.
If we specify more realistic aspects about the information set of each bargainer, the duration of bargaining procedure may not be so short. Since bargaining delay matters under imperfect information, here, we introduce bargaining problem without perfect information.
To In this bargaining, we have following transition probability matrix since they do not have any information about the partner's reservation price, which means that there is a high probability for offers to be in an unacceptable range.
[ Proposition 1: In a bargaining problem over the price of an object, when the information is imperfect, the expected duration of bargaining procedure given by (1) or (2), and tends to be very long.
Now it is shown that the bargaining delay becomes longer if only one side (buyer or seller) makes an offer.
To begin, we assume that only seller makes an offer each time and the buyer has option of accepting or rejecting it.
If the latter accepts the offer, the bargaining is over.
However, if he rejects it, he should wait for next offer.
In this simple model of bargaining, we can presume that seller has no incentive to offer a price below seller's reservation price and buyer has no incentive to reject an offer above it and below his reservation price. Reflecting this fact, we have one very simple transition matrix as following,
[ Table 3 ] Transition probability when only seller offers]
Thus, this process has two absorbing states of 1 and 2, and one transient state of 3. To measure the expected duration in state 3, again, we apply the above simple analysis of probability theory. Then, we get one system of equations where    denotes the duration for the bargaining to be in state 3 with initial state i. By solving
As seen in this solution of    , the duration of disagreement in bargaining can be long since there is no reason to expect the probability of   to be 0. As   approaches to 1, the duration becomes longer. Comparing (2) and (3), one can see the value in (3) is greater than that in (2), implying a longer delay of bargaining. Thus, we can see an intuitively interesting result that when both sides can make offers, the bargaining tends to end early.
Comparing to [ Figure 1 ], [ Figure 4 ] confirms this results.
[ Figure 4 ] Expected delay when only seller offers 
